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Abstract 
This paper reviews the state of the art in cyber security risk assessment of Cloud Computing systems. We select and examine in 
detail the quantitative security risk assessment models developed for or applied especially in the context of a Cloud Computing 
system. We review and then analyze existing models in terms of aim; the stages of risk management addressed; key risk 
management concepts covered; and sources of probabilistic data. Based on the analysis, we propose as well a comparison 
between these models to pick out limits and advantages of every presented model. 
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1. Introduction  
The importance of security concerns on the development and exploitation of information systems has never 
stopped growing. In fact, Information Systems are today used everywhere by individuals, organizations, 
governments and systems are target to information security attacks and it is very clear now that this would lead to a 
loss of a large amount of money, time and other resources. Thus, organizations may not only spend millions of 
dollars on technical security equipments such as firewalls, intrusion detection systems (IDSs) and encryption tools to 
try to protect them against known threats, but also are confronted with great difficulties for evaluating security 
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technology investments11. Indeed, firms aim to estimate the security breaches of their systems because organizations 
that best manage cyber-risk will be rewarded by a competitive market.  
On the other hand, individual or enterprise users expect information systems to be secured and able to predict 
their risk and their strategies in reducing these risks. The drive of secure organizational information has initiated the 
need to develop better metrics for understanding the state of the organization’s security attitude14, 15.  
The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) defines risk management as “the process of 
identifying risk, assessing risk, and taking steps to reduce risk to an acceptable level”13. The NIST defines risk 
assessment as the process of identifying, estimating, and prioritizing information security risks which requires a 
careful analysis of threat and vulnerability information to determine the extent to which circumstances or events 
could adversely impact an organization and the likelihood that such circumstances or events will occur13. 
Quantitative security risk assessment models are an effective tool to measure and assess the security levels of 
their systems, products, processes, and readiness to address the security issues they are facing. Metrics can also help 
to identify system vulnerabilities and provide guidance in prioritizing corrective actions. Moreover, metrics can be 
used to justify and direct future security investment16. Quantitative security metrics represent a means of quantifying 
the risks in monetary terms in such a way as to enable rational decision making. 
From the risk assessment literature, a number of metrics has evolved to measure security risks. In fact, we have 
two types of metrics: qualitative and quantitative metrics. We focus in this article on quantitative security risk 
assessment models for Cloud computing systems. In fact, Cloud Computing presents a new technology for 
delivering computing resources as a service and on demand but it has several limits like security which is considered 
as the basic barrier for cloud adoption. 
There are few quantitative models that estimate the security risks models for CC systems like MFC, MFCE 
MFCext, MFCint and M2FC3, 5, 7, 8, 10. We are interested in this work to review in detail quantitative security risk 
assessment models and then present comparisons between these models. This work is a detailed study of 
quantitative information security risk assessment models for Cloud Computing systems. The result will be a 
comparative and critic analysis of those models, and their significant concepts. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we announce the problem dealt with by the 
article. Section 3 provides some background discussion on what Cloud Computing systems are and on security 
challenges facing them. In section 4, we review quantitative security risk assessment models for CC systems. 
Section 5 provides a detailed analysis and comparison of the presented models. We draw some concluding remarks 
in Section 6. 
2. Problem statement  
There are strong drivers for addressing security risk assessment in a new perspective, especially for managing 
information security risk.  In fact, there are certain factors that provoke changes in firms. For example, the use of 
new technologies, the pressure of innovation and the pressure to cut costs oblige firms to take into account these 
aspects and the disregarding any of these factors can affect the organization’s reputation and customer confidence. 
Information Security risk assessment consider as a difficult and costly. In fact, if a new vulnerability or a new 
virus is detected, the results may be too costly. In addition, to provide fast and suitable response to security incidents 
and to protect their assets, organizations need for a systematic security risk assessments approach. Furthermore, 
individual or enterprise users expect information systems to be secured and able to predict their risk and their 
strategies in reducing these risks. The drive of secure organizational information has initiated the need to develop 
better metrics for understanding the state of the organization’s security attitude14, 15. On the other hand, risk 
assessment is one of the fundamental components of an organizational risk management process2. It is based on 
security metrics to assess security risks. 
3. Cloud Computing systems and cyber security challenges 
Cloud Computing is considered as a new technology that has enable innovation for a growing number 
organizations. It allows improving Cloud Computing capabilities as part of their innovation process, for their 
products and services delivery, and diversification, and for their overall organizational evolution and growth.  
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Cloud computing is an emerging paradigm of computing that replaces computing as a personal commodity by 
computing as a public utility. It may be defined as the delivery of on-demand computing resources over the Internet 
on a pay-for-use basis. The resources (such as processor compute time and data storage) are dynamically 
provisioned over the internet and its subscribers are invoiced based on the use of computing resources.  
There are many definitions for Cloud Computing. For example, the National Institute of Standards and 
Technology defines Cloud Computing as “a model which grants convenient, on-demand network access to a shared 
pool of configurable computing resources (e.g., networks, servers, storage, applications, and services) that can be 
rapidly provisioned and released with minimal management effort or service provider interaction”1.  
Cloud Computing presents its services as three layers of services which provide infrastructure resources, 
application platform and software as services to the consumer. Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) layer provides the 
basic computing infrastructure of servers, processing, storage, and networks. Platform as a Service (PaaS) layer 
presents a layer where users can deploy and install their applications. Software as a Service (SaaS) delivers 
applications through a web browser to thousands of customers without having to be installed on their computers.  
Cloud Computing offers all the advantages of a public utility system, in terms of economy of scale, flexibility 
and convenience but it raises substantial issues such as loss of control and loss of security.  
But as more and more information on individuals and companies are placed in the cloud, problems are beginning 
to grow especially about security. In fact, data users’ externalization makes hard to maintain data integrity and 
privacy, and availability which causes serious consequences. Security is the big challenge in cloud computing 
systems3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 18. In fact, According to a survey conducted by International Data Group (IDG) enterprise in 
201412 security is deeply the top concern for CC. In fact, up from 61% in 2014, and higher among finance 
organizations (78%), 67% of organizations have concerns about the security of cloud computing solutions. The 
additional challenges are not even on the same playing field for decision-makers; only 43% are concerned with 
integration, followed by the ability of cloud solutions to meet enterprise and/or industry standards (35%)12. Given 
their high security concerns, organizations are integrating strategies and tools (like cloud security management and 
monitoring tools) to lessen these challenges over the next months.  
4. Information security risk assessment models 
We introduce in this section the basic security risk assessment models for Cloud Computing system. In fact, these 
models quantify the security of a computing system by a random variable that represents for each stakeholder, the 
amount of loss that result from security threats and system vulnerabilities. We present hence five models to quantify 
security breaches for Cloud Computing application. 
4.1. SecAgreement: A Security Risk Assessment Model 
In18, Hale et al. presented a model called SecAgreement to enable cloud service providers to include increasing the 
likelihood that their services will be used. The approach defines a cloud service matchmaking algorithm to assess 
and rank SecAg enhanced SLA by their risk, allowing organizations to quantify risk, identify any policy compliance 
gaps that might exist, and thus select the cloud services that best meet their security needs.  
4.2. The Mean Failure Cost (MFC) 
Ben Aissa et al. introduce, in17, a cyber security metric called Mean Failure Cost (MFC) that quantifies the 
security of a computing system by the statistical mean of the random variable that represents for each stakeholder, 
the amount of loss that result from security threats and system vulnerabilities. The MFC varies by stakeholder and 
takes into account the variance of the stakes that a stakeholder has in meeting each security requirement. The 
infrastructure in question reflects the values that stakeholders have in each security requirement, the dependency of 
security requirements on the operation of architectural components and the impact that security threats have on these 
components. 
The MFC process proceeds in four steps: 
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x Generation of Stakes Matrix: Let ST(S, R) be the stakes matrix of dimension (i*j) where S represent system 
stakeholders and R represent the requirements of this system. The cell A(Si, Rj) represents the cost that 
stakeholder Si would lose if the system failed to meet the security requirement Rj. 
x Generation of Dependency Matrix: The dependency matrix represents how to estimate the probability that a 
particular security requirement is violated in the course of operating the system for some period of time.  
x Generation of Impact Matrix: The system architecture may present components that fail to operate properly as a 
result of security breakdowns caused by malicious activity. Thus, we must specify the set of threats related to this 
system. This matrix determines which threats affect which components and assess the likelihood of success of 
each threat in light of perpetrator behavior and possible counter-measures.  
Generation of the threat vector: The threat vector represents the probability that a threat materializes during 
unitary period of operation. 
4.3. The Mean Failure Cost External (MFCext) and the Mean Failure Cost Internal (MFCint) 
Jouini et al. proposed in7 a new model for quantifying security threats risks by considering a classification of the 
identified threats: the Internal MFC (MFCint) and the External MFC (MFCext). In fact, threats are classified using 
their sources in order to know the source of threats shaped information systems and especially the Cloud Computing 
systems to develop appropriate strategies to prevent, or mitigate their effects. In fact, we are based on threat sources 
dimensions in order to make out threats origins. The model considers that the security threat space intrusion is 
subdivided into subspaces according to a model of two dimensions labeled Internal, and External.  
This classification lets us to propose two new extension types of the threat vector (PT) of the MFC metric. 
Consequently, there will be two extensions measures of the mean failure cost (MFC). We can calculate the external 
mean failure cost (MFCext) and the internal mean failure cost (MFCint) depending on the attack space vector AS that 
present the probability that a threat is either internal or external.  
These new extensions of MFC model improve analysis of the vulnerability of the system. They allow specifying 
the nature of security solution that minimizes the mean failure cost.  
4.4. The MFC Extension model (MFCE) 
Jouini et al., suggested, in5, the Mean Failure Cost Extension (MFCE) as a new cyber security metric for 
information systems and for Cloud Computing environment particularly. The model is based on a threat 
classification model called as the Hybrid threat Classification model (HTC) and proposed in9. The HTC is generic 
model that combines several threats criteria or characteristics like: threat source, threat perpetrators, motives, intent, 
threats consequences. 
The MFCE model focus on refining the estimation of the impact matrix IM and the threat vector PT of the Mean 
Failure Cost model (MFC) introduced in previous section. This model allows studying the impact of a whole class 
of threats rather than a mere threat. Indeed, threats are variable in time and security solutions change over time. 
For the impact matrix IM, it was generated two new matrices: the impact matrix IMC and the threat classes 
Matrix CM. The ICM matrix presents the probability that a component Ck fails once a threat class Clr has 
materialized and the CM matrix presents the probability of having a threat class Clr once a threat Tq has occurred. 
The MFCE model represents a cyber security metric as a decision making technique for Cloud Computing 
environment to derive relevant decision making security solutions. This quantitative decision making metric allows 
selecting countermeasures per threats class rather than a threat to better study and identify security threats. 
4.5. Multi-dimensional Mean Failure Cost Model (M2FC) 
Jouini et al. propose, in10, adopt the multi-dimensional approach to assess security threats. They propose a new 
model for assessing the cost of the failure of an information system security that takes into account threats 
dimensions to better assess threats risks. The model called Multi dimensional Mean Failure Cost (M2FC) and 
considered that the threat world is divided into several threats perspectives each having several orthogonal 
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dimensions. In fact, any security threat presents several aspects, called perspectives, which increase the risk level 
faced by a system. These perspectives can decompose this space into several slices called as dimensions. 
For decomposition purpose, the model considers a leading dimension to allow focusing more on one dimension 
than the rest of the dimensions of the threat world. For example, to assess the mean failure cost per architectural 
components we choose the components dimension as the leading one. In other situations, we would like to focus not 
on components but on deployment site of the enterprise, then we will have the mean failure cost per location. 
The M2FC model takes into account the stakeholders assessment of the cost related to their requirements with 
regard to the elements of two dimensions. Thus, the model considers a set H of stakeholders and a set R of their 
requirements are distinguished from a set of the leading dimension and a set of the other considered dimensions 
(time, system’s component…). 
5. Comparative Study 
The study of the four quantitative security risk analysis models for CC systems aims to compare in greater detail the 
three different approaches and to present as well limits and advantages for each model.  
     The SecAgreement  model is a quantitative approach that is used to compare between cloud providers to select 
the best one basing on calculation of risk factor of each one and do not estimate risks due to security breaches for 
Cloud Computing environment. 
The Mean Failure Cost model (MFC) has several advantages. In fact, it quantifies the security of a system in 
financial terms, specially, in terms of how much each system stakeholder stands to lose as a result of security threats 
and system vulnerabilities. Indeed, this metric varies according to the stakes that each stakeholder has in meeting 
each security requirement. However, it presents several shortcomings. After studying and analyzing security threats 
and the MFC metric, we noticed the following MFC limits: 
x Security threats are evolutive and variable over time and have several characteristics, and in PT vector, there is 
no logical or hierarchical structure between the different catalogued threats as they are not based on a particular 
attribute to classify them. 
x Underestimation of the MFC: In fact, in the threat vector PT, the term used to define the threat can be ambiguous; 
this can lead to an overlap between the various threats i.e. each threat may belong to several classes at once and 
thus it is computed many times, so we have an underestimation of the mean failure cost. 
x Users who may use this method to derive threats may have completely different results. 
x Managers cannot identify the source of threats risks in order to suggest appropriate countermeasures. 
x The MFC is blind toward the structure and the dimensions of security threats. It considers that any failure due to 
a threat is a failure with respect to the whole specification. But stakeholders may have different stakes in different 
security threats dimensions and perspectives which are not reflected in the MFC. 
The MFCext and the MFCint give the critical threats space to help managers to take the appropriate 
countermeasures. They improve the analysis of the system vulnerability. They specify the type of solution to 
minimize the average cost of failure. In fact, using the threat classification source dimension, they allow identifying 
the source of the threats space (either internal or external source) to let managers concentrate on the intrusion space 
having the higher mean failure costs. However, it do not take into account all threats characteristics and just consider 
one criteria which  does not accurately describe a threat (like the source), so they do not give accurate values on the 
cost of security failure. In addition, the considered criteria (source) are based on a binary classification (internal or 
external) while threat sources may include three subclasses.  
The Mean Failure Cost Extension model (MFCE) considers threat classification on the basis of a model of threats 
classification and allows giving a threat solution by class, this model does not represent the cost according to 
security threats dimensions or perspectives. Also, we pointed out that the used threats classification model is not 
complete model in terms of size. In addition, if managers want to know critical criteria or dimension that influences 
the cost values of security failure, they cannot determinate them using these models. So we must develop a metric 
that accurately estimates security breaches and gives critical dimension to better manage security policies in 
organizations. Therefore, if the decisions makers want to have dimensions or critical criteria that influence actions of 
the cost of failure of security, they cannot determinate them using these models. 
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Finally, this M2FC is an improvement of the Mean Failure Cost (MFC)17. This model varies by stakeholder, and 
takes into account the variance of the stakes that a stakeholder has in meeting each security requirement but it does 
not take into account threat perspectives and dimensions. Moreover, this it considers a multi-dimensional 
appearance as a threat contains several dimensions, it takes into account threats perspectives to reduce security risk 
to each system and it considers changes in systems like changes in the deployment, components and changes in user 
access policies. Thus, it takes into account threats dimensions and perspectives aspect and allows identifying critical 
dimensions that cause the biggest costs. 
6. Conclusion  
Risk assessment is a crucial mechanism in the wheel of Information Security Management. It is important for 
enterprises to adopt a systematic and well-structured process for assessing information security risks to its assets. 
The main purpose of the study is to review and compare and quantitative security risk model for Cloud Computing 
systems since these systems represent a prospect technology for firms that reduce cost and improve as well 
organizations’ brand. The resulting comparison help decisions makers to select the suitable models to assess security 
risks for CC environment and indeed for other information systems. In fact, it helps evaluating the models’ 
applicability to an organization and their specific needs.  
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